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当前外空军事对抗形势复杂，外空武器化、战场化风险加剧。在联合国外空安全规则谈判中，各国越来越重视通过法律解释来调整和规制外空军事行为。国家责任法及其不法性排除制度，尤其是反措施制度与外空军事对抗活动紧密相关，其解释适用将成为未来外空舆论法理斗争焦点问题之一。一国实施外空国际不法行为，受害国可采取反措施促使责任国停止不法侵害，并援引反措施制度排除其行为不法性，但应注意遵守目的要求、相称性要求及通知要求。结合在轨抵近、干扰等典型外空军事对抗场景，明确反措施制度实施前提和适用要求，有助于提升各国对反措施制度的法律认知，推动各国尽快达成相关法律共识，维护外空安全。
Abstract：The current landscape of military confrontation in outer space is increasingly complex, with growing risks of weaponization, and battlefieldization in the space domain. In the negotiations on the formulation of United Nations rules for outer space security, states are increasingly attaching importance to adjusting and regulating military activities in outer space through legal interpretation. As an important component of general international law, state responsibility law and its articles about precluding wrongfulness, especially the countermeasure system, are closely related to military confrontation activities in outer space. Its interpretation and application will become one of the key issues in the legal struggle of public opinion on outer space in the future. When a state commits an internationally wrongful act in outer space, the injured state may take countermeasures to induce the responsible state to cease its wrongful act and invoke the countermeasure system to preclude the wrongfulness of its own actions, but it should pay attention to complying with the requirements of purpose, proportionality and notification. By combining typical space military confrontation scenarios such as on-orbit approaching and disruptive jamming, clarifying the implementation prerequisites and application requirements of the countermeasure system can help enhance the legal understanding of the countermeasure system among states, promote the prompt reaching of relevant legal consensus among states and safeguard outer space security.
[1]《中国出席联合国未来峰会和第79届联合国大会立场文件》，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zcwj_674915/202409/t20240919_11492977.shtml,2024年11月28日访问。
[2]《常驻联合国代表傅聪大使在安理会表决外空安全决议草案时的发言》，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/wjzs/202404/t20240425_11289043.shtml,2024年11月28日访问。
[3]王国语：《国际规则视角下的外空军控发展形势》，《世界知识》2020年第21期，第73页。
[4]王国语：《美国〈外空防务战略〉对外空军控国际规则博弈的影响分析》，《太平洋学报》2021年第3期，第94-106页。
[1]王国语、张承云：《外空安全活动与国际法的关系》，载戴怀成主编：《2024国际军备控制与裁军》，世界知识出版社2024年版，第95-110页。
[2]联合国大会1961年12月20日第1721A和B(XVI)号决议第1条规定：“请各国采纳下列原则，俾于探测及使用外空时有所遵循：（a）国际法，包括联合国宪章在内，对外空及各天体一体适用……”
[3]《外空条约》第3条规定：“各缔约国在进行探索和利用外层空间（包括月球和其他天体）的各种活动方面，应遵守国际法和联合国宪章，以维护国际和平与安全，促进国际合作和了解。”
[4]国家责任法不法性排除制度中，“同意”缺乏国际实践；“自卫”适用于敏感度更高的、使用武力进行攻防对抗的场景；“不可抗力”“危难”“危急情况”多针对人力以外的情形，因此当下只有国际不法行为采取的反措施制度与外空军事对抗活动最为相关。
[5]美国国防部2021年版《国防部军事及相关术语词典》将“反措施”定义为“一种军事科学，其目标是通过使用装置和/或技术，来削弱敌方活动的作战效能。”Jack Beard et al.(eds.),The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations,Rule 25,section 3,https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780192870667.001.0001,visited 12 August 2025.
[1]《外空条约》第6条规定：各缔约国对其（不论是政府部门，还是非政府的团体组织）在外层空间（包括月球和其他天体）所从事的活动，要承担国际责任，并应负责保证本国活动的实施，符合本条约的规定。非政府团体在外层空间（包括月球和其他天体）的活动，应由有关的缔约国批准，并连续加以监督。保证国际组织遵照本条约之规定在外层空间（包括月球和其他天体）进行活动的责任，应由该国际组织及参加该国际组织的本条约缔约国共同承担。
[2]关于归责与归因的区别：Guoyu Wang&Yifan Hu, Allocation and Attribution of Commercial Space Activities in Armed Conflict, 50 Air&Space Law 1-22(2025); Guoyu Wang, The Complex Neutrality of Commercial Space Actors in Armed Conflict, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2023/11/16/the-complex-neutrality-of-commercial-space-actors-in-armed-conflict/, visited 25 May 2025.
[3]James Crawford, State Responsibility 113(Cambridge University Press 2013).
[4]《国家责任条款草案》第30条。
[5]《国家责任条款草案》第30条。
[6]《国家责任条款草案》第31条、第34条至第37条。
[1]章节：《“星链”如何影响俄乌冲突》，《环球时报》2022年10月18日，第8版。
[2]关于国家责任法归因标准之“特定密切的联系”的具体论述，可参见王国语、胡艺凡：《商业航天介入他国武装冲突的法律问题分析》，载李驰江主编：《2023国际军备控制与裁军》，世界知识出版社2023年版，第131-149页。
[3]《国家责任条款草案》第8条规定：“如果一个人或一群人实际上是在按照国家的指示或在其指挥或控制下行事，其行为应视为国际法所指的一国的行为。”
[4]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 8, para.1.
[5]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 8, para.2.
[6]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 8, para.3.
[7]Prosecutor v. Tadié, ICTY Appeal Chamber Case No. 94-1-A, Judgement, para.131.
[8]Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 2007, paras.385-412.
[9]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 8, pp.47-49.
[1]Prosecutor v. Tadié, ICTY Appeal Chamber Case No. 94-1-A, Judgement, para.131.
[2]Matti Koskenniemi, Doctrines of State Responsibility, in James Crawford et al.(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility 45-51(Oxford University Press 2010).转引自何志鹏、魏晓旭：《武装冲突中国家责任的归因标准探究》，《社会科学战线》2021年第3期，第194-203页。
[3]王国语：《空间法中的国籍联系》，《河北法学》2012年第3期，第91-98页。
[4]王国语、胡艺凡：《商业航天介入他国武装冲突的法律问题分析》，载李驰江主编：《2023国际军备控制与裁军》，世界知识出版社2023年版，第131-149页。
[5]例如，商业公司直接对交战一方实施阻断式干扰、欺骗、网络攻击、共轨操控；商业公司直接利用航天器、航天活动对交战一方威胁或使用武力；商业公司直接利用航天器、航天活动对交战一方实施武力攻击。关于“线段理论”与“比例理论”的具体内容可参见王国语、胡艺凡：《商业航天介入他国武装冲突的法律问题分析》，载李驰江主编：《2023国际军备控制与裁军》，世界知识出版社2023年版，第131-149页。
[6]例如，商业公司为交战一方提供公益服务（如用于防灾减灾的遥感服务）；商业公司为交战一方提供一般性的商业航天服务；商业公司为交战一方提供的商业航天活动或合作存在敏感情形（如交战方的商业合作对象与该国军方有密切合作等）。
[1]Guoyu Wang&Yifan Hu, Allocation and Attribution of Commercial Space Activities in Armed Conflict, 50 Air&Space Law 1-22(2025).
[2]贺其治：《国家责任法及案例浅析》，法律出版社2003年版，第112页。
[3]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 2, para.8.
[4]虽然国际空间法并未明确规定“非政府实体”与该国的关系，但一般认为，如果本国为某公司的国籍国，或为该公司航天活动颁发了许可，即可主张本国为该公司的航天活动承担国际责任。开展“星链”计划的Space X公司是美国公司，且美国相关部门为“星链”计划颁发了频谱许可和发射许可，因此根据“国籍联系”“许可联系”等标准，可将星链提供军事通信服务的行为界定为美国的本国活动。关于“国籍联系”与“本国活动”的确定，可参见王国语：《空间法中的国籍联系》，《河北法学》2012年第3期，第91-98页。
[1]加布奇科沃-大毛罗斯项目案中，国际法院认为，反措施的目的必须是促使责任国遵守其国际法规定的义务，因此反措施必须是可逆的（Reversible），有学者认为国际法院确认了“采取反措施的方式应当尽可能容许责任国恢复履行被违反并招致反措施的义务”体现的是反措施具有可逆性。Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports,1997, para.87;[美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第151页。
[2]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Chap. 5, para.2; James Crawford, State Responsibility 688(Cambridge University Press 2013).
[3]该模型为笔者参考经典威慑博弈模型、拥有可信威胁的完美威慑博弈模型、单边威慑模型自行构建。Frank C. Zagare&Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence 285-293(Cambridge University Press 2000); Stephen L. Quackenbush, Deterrence Theory:Where Do We Stand?, 2 Review of International Studies 741-762(2011).
[1]赞格尔（Zagare）和基尔戈（Kilgour）认为，以冲突是最坏的结果构建的经典威慑理论模型，存在“相互威慑的悖论”（Paradox of Mutual Deterrence），也即挑战者最倾向于防守者让步，而防守者最倾向于维持现状。但是，他们都认为冲突是最坏的结果。因此防守者面临两难境地：与冲突相比，让步会带来更有利的结果；但如果挑战者知道防守者会让步，挑战者就会一直进攻，威慑就会一直失败，那唯一的结局就是挑战者赢。为弥补经典威慑理论逻辑上的漏洞，赞格尔和基尔戈在保留理性假设，放弃“冲突是最坏的结局”的假设的基础上，提出了完美威慑理论。Frank C. Zagare&Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence285-293(Cambridge University Press 2000).
[2]Frank C. Zagare&Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence 39, 127(Cambridge University Press 2000).
[3]Stephen L. Quackenbush, Deterrence Theory:Where Do We Stand?, 2 Review of International Studies 741-762(2011).
[4]Stephen L. Quackenbush, Deterrence Theory:Where Do We Stand?, 2 Review of International Studies 741-762(2011).
[1]Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now 12(Cambridge University Press 2003).
[2]朱磊：《论国际法上的反措施在网络空间的适用》，《武大国际法评论》2019年第4期，第136-157页。
[3]贺其治：《国家责任法及案例浅析》，法律出版社2003年版，第162-164页。
[4]Russian Federation, Proposal on the Review and Consideration of the Concept of a United Nations Information Platform Serving Common Needs in Collecting and Sharing Information on Near-Earth Space Monitoring in the Interests of the Safety of Space Operations, and Its Architectural and Programmatic Aspects, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2015/aac.105l/aac.105l.293_0.html, visited 29 September 2025; Russian Federation, Proposal on the Review and Consideration of the Concept of a UN Information Platform Serving Common Needs in Collecting and Sharing Formation on Near-Earth Space Monitoring in the Interests of Safety of Space Operations, and Its Architectural and Programmatic Aspects, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/oosadoc/data/documents/2015/aac.105c.12015crp/aac.105c.12015crp.32_0.html, visited 29 September 2025.
[5]UN, GA Official Records Eightieth Session Supplement No.20, A/80/20, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/a/a8020_0_html/A_80_020E.pdf, visited 14 September 2025; United Arab Emirates, Proposal for the Establishment of an Expert Group on Space Situational Awareness, A/AC.105/2025/CRP.27/Rev.4, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/aac_1052025crp/aac_1052025crp_27rev_4_0_html/AC105_2025_CRP27Rev04E.pdf, visited 14 September 2025.
[1]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 49, para.4.
[2]Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1997, para.83.
[3]《国家责任条款草案》第49条第3款规定：“反措施应尽可能容许恢复履行有关义务。”
[4][美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第152页。
[5]Michael N. Schmitt,“Below the Threshold”Cyber Operations:The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 Virginia Journal of International Law 714(2014); Ross Brown, Conflict on the Final Frontier:Deficiencies in the Law of Space Conflict Below Armed Attack, and How to Remedy Them, 1 Georgetown Journal of International Law 32(2019); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1997, p.57.
[6]Ross Brown, Conflict on the Final Frontier:Deficiencies in the Law of Space Conflict Below Armed Attack, and How to Remedy Them, 1 Georgetown Journal of International Law 11-80(2019).
[1]Ross Brown, Conflict on the Final Frontier:Deficiencies in the Law of Space Conflict Below Armed Attack, and How to Remedy Them, 1 Georgetown Journal of International Law 80(2019).
[2]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 51, para.2.
[3]Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasure, 12 European Journal of International Law 889(2001).
[4]《国家责任条款草案》第51条规定：“反措施必须和所遭受的损害相称，并应考虑到国际不法行为的严重程度和有关权利。”
[5]UN, Reports of International Arbitral Awards(XVIII), 9 December 1978, pp.417-493.
[6]Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1997, para.82.
[7][美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第159页；ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Chap. 2, para.5.
[8]Jack Beard et al.(eds.),The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Activities and Operations, Rule 28, section 8, https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780192870667.001.0001, visited 12 August 2025.
[1][美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第159页；ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Chap. 2, para.5.
[2]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 51, para.3.
[3]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 51, paras.3-6.
[4]《国家责任条款草案》第51条英文表述为“The Gravity of the Internationally Wrongful Act”，中文表述为“国际不法行为的严重程度”。
[5]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 51, para.7.
[6]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 51, para.7.
[1]James Crawford, State Responsibility 699(Cambridge University Press 2013).
[2][美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第159页。
[3]《国家责任条款草案》第52条规定：“1.一受害国在采取反措施以前应：(a)根据第43条要求责任国按照第二部分的规定履行其义务；(b)将采取反措施的任何决定通知责任国并提议与该国进行谈判。2.虽有第1款(b)项的规定，受害国可采取必要的紧急反措施以维护其权利。3.在下列情况下不得采取反措施，如已采取，务必停止，不得无理拖延：(a)国际不法行为已经停止，并且(b)已将争端提交有权作出对当事国具有约束力之决定的法院或法庭。4.若责任国不秉诚履行解决争端程序，第3款即不适用。”
[4]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 52, para.5.
[5]James Crawford, State Responsibility 701(Cambridge University Press 2013).
[6]James Crawford, State Responsibility 700(Cambridge University Press 2013).
[7]《外空条约》第9条规定，提前磋商义务要求当一国在外空计划进行的活动或实验可能对他国和平探索和利用外空的活动造成潜在有害干扰时，该国应提前进行适当的国际磋商。
[1]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 52, para.5.
[2]Maurice Kamto, The Time Factor in the Application of Countermeasures, in James Crawford et al.(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility 1171(Oxford University Press 2010).
[3][德]斯蒂芬·霍贝等主编：《科隆空间法评注第一卷：外空条约》，李寿平等译，世界知识出版社2017年版，第303页。
[1]Black’s Law Dictionary 1167(Thomson Reuters 2009).
[2]Black’s Law Dictionary 358(Thomson Reuters 2009).
[3]ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol.II, Part Two, Art. 52, para.6.
[1]Ross Brown, Conflict on the Final Frontier:Deficiencies in the Law of Space Conflict Below Armed Attack, and How to Remedy Them, 1 Georgetown Journal of International Law 11-80(2019).
[2][美]迈克尔·施密特：《网络行动国际法塔林手册2.0版》，黄志雄等译，社会科学文献出版社2017年版，第152页。
[1]《中国出席联合国未来峰会和第79届联合国大会立场文件》，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zcwj_674915/202409/t20240919_11492977.shtml,2024年11月28日访问。
基本信息:
DOI：10.13871/j.cnki.whuilr.2025.06.004
中图分类号:D999.1
引用信息:
[1]王国语,刘佳琦.反措施制度在外空军事对抗活动中的适用问题[J].武大国际法评论,2025,9(06):59-76.DOI:10.13871/j.cnki.whuilr.2025.06.004.