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联合国大会于2016年12月21日设立的叙利亚问题"国际公正独立机制"并非和平解决国际争端意义上的国际调查机制,而是一个具有刑事侦查权的辅助机关。《联合国宪章》第22条和第29条不足以成为联大设立这一机制的依据。《联合国宪章》中也没有任何条款可以说明联大依据《联合国宪章》而拥有暗含权力来设立这一机制。因此,联大设立这一机制不具有合法性。由于刑事侦查权是一项国际刑法上的执法权力,因此只有安理会依据《联合国宪章》第七章才能具有这样的权力。联大"平行处理"国际和平与安全事项的嗣后实践也不支持这一机制的合法性。另外,"国际公正独立机制"的非法设立也是国际性机构扩权倾向的新体现。
Abstract：The "International Impartial and Independent Mechanism"for Syria established by the UN General Assembly( UNGA) on 21 December 2016 is not an international inquiry in the sense of peaceful settlement of international disputes,but a subsidiary organ with the power to conduct criminal investigations. Neither article 22 nor article 29 of the UN Charter could be regarded as the legal basis for the UNGA to establish such a mechanism. No other articles in the UN Charter indicate that the UNGA has an implied power to do so. Accordingly,the establishment of such a mechanism is not legal. As the power to conduct criminal investigations is an executive power in international criminal law,such a power can only be authorized by the UN Security Council( UNSC) on basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. The subsequent practice of the UNGA in dealing with matters relating to international peace and security parallel with the UNSC does not support the legality of such a mechanism. Moreover,the illegal establishment of this mechanism is the latest development of current trend of power-expanding of international bodies.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.13871/b.cnki.whuilr.2017.05.005
中图分类号:D813.2
引用信息:
[1]朱利江,杨承甫.论联大设立叙利亚“国际公正独立机制”的不法性[J].武大国际法评论,2017,1(05):54-70.DOI:10.13871/b.cnki.whuilr.2017.05.005.
2017-10-15
2017-10-15